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Technologies are the tools that situation is changing. A large propeople use to get things done, butportion of implementation attempts
the promise of new technology iscontinue to fail to accomplish their
limited by its successful implemen- stated goals and potential adopters
tation in organizations. Visits to anyare beginning to question the real
technology fair or convention cannotvalue of new office technologies
but help to instill a sense of wonder(Bowen, 1986). This paper offers an
and anticipation given the breadthelaborated model of new technology

of the possibilities. The 1992 Fallimplementation. This model ex-

Comdex scheduled over 2,000 ven- plains two important paradoxes of
dors and 140,000 visitors (Dvorak,new technology introductions by em1993; Malloy, 1993). However, thephasizing the critical role of adopt-

vision is often different if the exhib-

ers' cognitions including adopters'
ited products are followed into anthoughts, perceptions, and conorganization. Marzchzak suggestedstructed understandings of the new
in 1988 that most new productiontechnology (e.g., Barley, 1986;
technology implementations fail. Goodman and Griffith, 1991; OrliSimilarly, Bikson and Gutek (1984)kowski, 1992; Sproull and Hofmeisfound that 40% of 2,000 surveyedter, 1986).
U.S. companies had not achieved the Although there are many defi-

intended benefits from implement-nitions of technology, here we will
ing new office technology. There isuse "technology" to refer to any
little to suggest that this deplorablesystem of components that act on
* The authors would like to thank Dorothy Leonard-Barton for her comments on an earlier

draft.
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or change an object
from
one state
mentation
of a new technology:
unto another (Goodman
Griffith,
freezing,and
movement,
and refreezing.

1991). Specific examples
of new
Over the years, researchers
have
modified Lewin's
modelare
in a number
technologies include
(but
not
limited to): computer-aided
manof ways (e.g., lippitt et al.,
1958),
ufacturing, computerized
group
primarily by adding a fourth
stage
decision supportin tools
(software
the change process:
diagnosis. Di-

and hardware), and
electronic
mail.
agnosis
is generally a prerequisite
to
the implementation of a new techplementation of new technology.nology. Diagnosis entails identifying
Implementation includes any procthe problem or opportunity that inesses undertaken to institutionalize
vokes a change, identifying the feaa new technology as a stable part tures of the problem or opportunity,
of the organization (Tornatzky and and then selecting an appropriate
Johnson, 1982; Ettlie, 1984; Lucas,action plan (for instance, a new tech-

The focus of our model is the im-

1986). Users and implementers arenology!) that appears to solve the
the major actors during new tech-problem or address the opportunity
nology implementation, and are (Northcraft and Neale, 1994). In the
also the focus of the model pre- technology literature, diagnosis is resented here. Implementers are the ferred to as the adoption decision
agents for new technology intro- (e.g., Dean, 1987).
duction, including those individuals
Unfreezing follows diagnosis.
who train and support new users. The primary purpose of the unUsers are the individuals who use
freezing stage is for implementers
the new technology to get workto build a successful foundation on
done.
which the actual change to a new
technology can take place. During
Traditional Models of

unfreezing, implementers of a new

technology must break down the
resistance of prospective users.
Successful implementation efforts
That may entail selling prospective
Implementation

can be characterized in terms of the

users on the appropriateness of the
stages, processes, and goals dediagnosis, so that the change seems
scribed in Figure 1. This review fo- meaningful and sensible. Unfreez-

cuses specifically on the cognitive ing certainly entails making sure
aspects of new technology imple-that prospective users understand
mentation. (For a comprehensive re-the new technology, and are pre-

view of new technology implementation see, Goodman and Griffith,
1991; Zammuto and O'Connor,
1992.)
Stages

Lewin's (1951) classic model of

pared for the consequences of

changing over to the new technology (e.g., decreased performance
during the "breaking in" period).
Following unfreezing is the movement stage of implementation,

when the new technology is
brought on line and prospective

change in organizations suggests users become users. The final stage
three critical stages in the imple- of implementation is refreezing.
JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. V Number 4 Winter 1993
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Figure 1
Implementation Characteristics

STAGES

PROCESSES

GOALS

Diagnosis Socialization Knowledge
Unfreezing Commitment Attitudes
Movement Reward Allocation Use

Refreezing Feedback-and-Redesign Group Norms
Diffusion

users - breaking down their resisDuring refreezing, implementers
must follow-up even apparently
tance and gaining their acceptance
successful new technology introand use of the new technology ductions to insure that favorable
are ambiguous processes with no
changes attained during introducvisible end (Goodman and Griffith,
tion of the new technology become1991). In fact, refreezing might be
institutionalized in the organiza-thought of as a continuance of the
tion. Refreezing during a new techfine-tuning of users' acceptance
nology implementation may
which was initiated during unfreezinclude adjustments to the organi-ing. Unfortunately, adoption decization as well as to the technologysion makers often incorrectly
(Leonard-Barton, 1988).
assume that what has become clear
Perhaps the greatest roadblock to to them after many hours of disuccessful new technology imple- agnosis deliberations will, of

mentation is that unfreezing and
refreezing - preparing the organization for a new technology and insuring that the technology has been

accepted - typically command far
less organizational attention than
diagnosis and movement. Diagnosis

course, be self-evident to users dur-

ing movement (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971).

Processes

Goodman and Griffith (1991) suggest that successful implementation
crete, and definable goals, namely,
find the best technology for the requires that five critical dynamic
purpose (diagnosis) and get it in processes occur: socialization, commitment, reward allocation, feedthe hands of prospective users
back-and-redesign, and diffusion.
(movement). In contrast, unfreezing and refreezing of prospective These processes will be differentially
and movement have clear, con-
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important depending
the
stage
ing an on
adaptive
fit between
newof
the implementation
andand
the
partictechnology
the organization
to

ular setting. Socialization
achieve a synergisticinvolves
result. Diffu-

having users come sion
to
understand
refers
to the spread of the the
new
new technology, in
particular
seeing
technology
through the organization. Diffusion
and feedback-andit as an integral part
of the
accomplishment of their work
tasks,
rather of
redesign are
critical components

the movement and
refreezing
than something separate
or
extra.

stages
of a new technology
impleSocialization begins
during
unfreezmentation. Tobegin
the extent that
ing when implementers
todifsell

feedback-and-redesign
prospective usersfusion
on and
the
appropriare more
successful, commitmentSoateness of the new
technology.
and socialization
likely toas
cialization continues
for are
asmore
long

occur.and/or
On the other hand,
diffuthere are new users
adaptasion and feedback-and-redesign
are
tions to the technology.
Commit-

ment occurs when users have

more likely to occur once a new

has been accepted (soaccepted the technology to the technology
point

cialization) and users are committhat they are willing to work at makto its success.
ing it successful. The successful ted
commitment of users to a new

Goals
technology can begin as early
as diagnosis, if prospective users are in-

volved in the selection of the new

techology (Huse and Cummings,

1985). Reward allocation refers to
users coming to see the value (and/
or costs) of using the new technology. Reward allocations may be direct incentives for using the technology (e.g., monetary bonuses for
use) or rewards that accrue because

the technology makes users' work
easier or better. Convincing pro-

spective users of the rewards of a
new technology is imperative during unfreezing, though additional
rewards (and costs) often are revealed during movement and re-

freezing. Feedback-and-redesign
occurs when users develop a sufficient understanding of a new
technology to adjust it, or the or-

ganization around the new tech-

nology, to new and better uses.
Leonard-Barton (1988) has noted

that implementation success is critically dependent upon users attain-

The success of a new technology
implementation can be measured

by four implementation goals:
users' knowledge of the system,

their attitudes toward the new tech-

nology, their actual use of the tech-

nology, and finally group norms
concerning the acceptance and

value of the new technology in the

organization (Goodman and Grif-

fith, 1991). These goals also may

vary in importance, depending
upon the stage of the implementation and the technology (Goodman and Griffith, 1991). For

instance, users' attitudes would be
a primary concern during unfreezing, since a positive attitude might

be a necessary prerequisite to acquiring knowledge about using the
system. Actual use and group

norms, on the other hand, would
seem to be more critical measures

during refreezing where they

would define the long-term success
of the implementation.
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A Frame-Based Model of

Frames invoke selective perception
processes (e.g., Dearborn and
Simon, 1958) and thus play a role
in how users make sense of a new
Within these stages, processes,
and goals of new technology imtechnology in its organizational setplementation, several researchers
ting (e.g., Louis, 1980). Frames are
(e.g., Barley, 1986; Goodman andrelated to the knowledge structures
Griffith, 1991; Sproull and Hof-(including schémas and scripts) that
meister, 1986) have emphasized the
help individuals understand what

Implementation

critical role of cognitions. Cogni-

things are when they look at them

minds, including thoughts, beliefs,

ever, frames are pre-schematic and

tions are what goes on in people's
and understandings. These cognitions include beliefs held by users
(and implementers) about the roles,

relationships, goals, and processes
of the new technology. However,

there has been little empirical work
focusing on the socialization and/or
commitment processes in new tech-

nology implementation (Goodman
and Griffith, 1991; Sproull and
Hofmeister, 1986) where implementers would be expected to de-

velop favorable cognitions in users.

This seems a puzzling oversight,
since only 10% of implementation
failures appear to be the result of
technical problems (i.e., poor di-

agnosis). Most implementation failures stem from ''human and

organizational" problems (Turnage, 1990), that is, poor management by implementers of the
unfreezing, movement, and refreezing of a new technology.
One cognition of particular interest in new technology implementation is the frame (e.g.,
Goffman, 1974). Frames are the
perceptual sets that individuals
bring to or develop during imple-

mentation. Frames direct an indi-

vidual's critical perception

(Taylor and Crocker, 1980). How-

help individuals decide what
knowledge structures (e.g., schema
or scripts) apply to a given situa-

tion. In implementation, the users*

frames will limit both what they
hear in implementers' introductions and training, as well as how

users interpret the new technology
when they experience it.
The model of new technology
implementation that follows in this
paper elaborates the critical role
that implementer and user frames
play in successful implementation
(as shown in Figure 2). The focus
of this model is the user, the target
of the implementation effort. This
model has four important elements: (1) implementer frames

and the information these frames

lead implementers to provide users

during implementation, (2) user
frames and the information they
lead users to seek during implementation, (3) user experiences

with the new technology when they
work with it, and finally (4) users'

social constructions (e.g., Barley,
1986) of the technology. Users' so-

cial constructions of a new tech-

nology are the understandings
(what it is, what it can do) that

users come to believe. Users' social
processes (Pinkley, 1991), including
what to attend to, what to make of
constructions are the outcome of
in the model because users'
something, and how to interpret interest
it.
JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. V Number 4 Winter 1993
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social constructions subsume three

adoxes represent the pitfalls and

of the four goals of implementationpromise of new technology imple-

noted above (knowledge, attitudes,mentation.
and group norms), all of which together should drive the real goal of
PARADOX 1:
implementation - effective use of
The Paradox of Value
the technology. In this model,
users' social constructions are a
Sproull and Hofmeister (1986)
present
consequence of the interaction
of one of the few studies fouser and implementer framescused
andon users' frames during new
technology implementation, and
user experiences with the technolthat new technology imogy during implementation. conclude
This
plementation contains a "paradox
model builds on Sproull and Hofof value." Sproull and Hofmeister
meister's (1986) work and links it
studied a superintendent's implewith March's (1971) ideas of the
mentation
attempt of an accounttechnology of foolishness. The
ability program (focusing on
model predicts both promises and
teaching materials and testing) in a
pitfalls. Some managerial implica-

tions are identified which may improve successful implementation.
The basic argument of the model

is that users come to implementa-

tion with a frame that affects the

large city school district. They

found that the superintendent (as
implementer) emphasized the program's positive features because

they were salient to him and in or-

der to encourage people to try the
system. "But, as is inevitably the
implementers enter implementacase, things did not go perfectly
tion with a frame that affects the
with.." the program and the users
information that they provide to
decreased their positive regard for
users. As shown in Figure 2, users
the program (Sproull and Hofconstruct an understanding of the
meister, 1986:57). The paradox is
technology - how to use it and
that had the superintendent promwhether it is worth using - based
ised less, the users might have been
information they search for, while

upon the information they are provided by implementers and the ex-

less discouraged with the program's

faults.

periences they have with the
Sproull and Hofmeister (1986)
technology. Users' constructed un- show that the frames of implemenderstandings guide their interpre- ters diverge significantly from the
tation of subsequent experiences frames of the prospective users, as

with the technology, and those sub- shown in Figure 3. We characterize
sequent experiences with the tech- these two dimensions as Positive/

nology in turn provide users
opportunities to test and modify

their constructions. The contrast
between the information users nat-

urally seek and the information im-

plementers provide creates two
important paradoxes: The two par-

Negative and Description/Operation (Griffith and Northcraft,
1991). Implementers focus on a

view of the new technology that is

positively biased, more favorable
than it should be (e.g., Baier et al,
1986). The source of this positive

JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. V Number 4 Winter 1993
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Figure 2

Frame-Based Model of the Social Construction of a New Te

χ - τ: User

hrame: User
| Construction
Social
hrame:
Knowledoe
^ Construction
^^SZTZ Ν

Role Demands -τ

Relevant j { Belief that Á [ i [ Attitudes

^Experience ) úm is more Belief that

I v to learn J there is more

^ Implementer
Frame:

Self- Justification

Role Demands fiïu *'

^Expertise ) Experience
Free Training

versus

On-the-Job

^Performance^

bias may be role demands. Imple-

menter s may focus on the positive

aspects of the new technology be-

cause of their role as advocates for

ural frames of users, on the other
hand, tend to be more balanced,
focusing on both positive and negative aspects of the new technology

the technolgy; that is, implemen- (Griffith and Northcraft, 1991).

ters may feel that it is their job to Without any prior introduction, expresent the new technology in theperience, or a vested interest in the
success of the technology, users are
best light. These role demands
likely to have a much more objecmight elicit self-justification proc-

tive view of the new technology,
esses (e.g., Staw and Ross, 1979).
one that sees (or at least searches
Implementers may come to esfor) both the positive and negative
pouse only positive views of the
technology because their role
aspects.
forces them to publicly voice such Implementers also tend to be
opinions, and it is easier to present more focused on why to use the
such views publicly when one be- new technology (its benefits and
lieves in them. Finally, implemen- uses). Users, in contrast, also want
to know how to use the technology.
ters' great exposure to and
expertise with the new technology
For example, Griffith and North(1991) asked novice users of
no doubt allows them to adjust craft
to
the limitations or costs of a new
a group support system (electronic
meeting hardware and software) to
technology, making those limitations or costs less frustrating or list
an-the five most important things

noying than they might be to

someone encountering the technology for the first time. The nat-

they would tell new users of the

system. Although Positive/Description information dominated, novice

JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. V Number 4 Winter 1993
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Figure 3

Balanced and Unbalanced Implementation Frames

Positive Negative

Operations ^vv/vv^^ /vvvvvvvv^

'///' Balanced |x^| Unbalanced

Note: Balanced frames (often held by Users) represent cognitions that include information from all
four quadrants. Unbalanced frames (often held by Implementers) represent cognitions that only include
information from the Positive/Description quadrant. Surprises during implementation are more likely
for users provided with Unbalanced implementation frames.

users listed comments from each of

formation was significantly less bi-

ased than was the information the
the four quadrants described
above: (1) Positive/Description - implementers said they would pro"The system lets you concentrate vide to new users.

on one problem at a time," (2) Neg-

Again, implementers* greater ex-

ative/Description - "Some people posure to and experience with the
are intimidated in a computer fa- new technology no doubt has lowcility," (3) Positive/Operation ered the salience of operational
"You should practice using all the
concerns; for an expert user, those
keys," and (4) Negative/Operathings are well learned and astion - "Do not read other people's
sumed. Thus, implementers probcomments before writing your
ably underestimate the complexity

own." The distribution of this in-

or difficulty that prospective users

JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. V Number 4 Winter 1993
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perceive when they are sure
first
introoperational
success. Users' iniduced to a new technology.
In such
tial experiences
with the technology
situations, novice users will
will
have aand their attitudes
be negative,

strong need to reduce toward
uncertainty
and subsequent use of the
(Lester, 1986) and gain control
new technology will suffer accord(Falcione and Wilson, 1988).
ingly.
Of course, the quadrants in FigThe paradox here is that impleure 3 hold different levels of immenters face a dilemma. If implementers present a balanced view of
portance in implementation. In
the technology (a balanced view of
particular, without Positive De-

scriptions (e.g., descriptions of the
benefits of adopting the new tech-

the technology's positives and negatives), they are abdicating their ad-

likely to get very interested in the
new technology. This suggests that

user interest. If implementers pres-

nology), prospective users are un-

implementers have an advocacy
role, a responsibility to sell the
technology to prospective users. It
also emphasizes the critical role

that implementers play as the starting point for users' interpretations
of their initial experiences with the
technology.
The "paradox of value" is that implementers present users an unrealistically positive and insufficiently

practical view of a new technology
(represented in Figure 3 as the Un-

balanced/I mplemen ter frame). As a
consequence, users' first experiences
with a new technology will be frustrating. Although users may discover
some positive surprises (benefits of
the technology that they were not

aware of), for the most part users
will encounter "negative surprises "
(Louis, 1980). These negative sur-

prises will be of two different sorts.
First, users will encounter negatives
of the technology - things the tech-

nology cannot do that users expected it could. Second, users will

encounter operational difficulties users will be unable to make the

vocacy role and risk losing initial

ent an advocacy view of the technology (a view biased toward

positive descriptions), they risk losing long-term user interest via negative surprises encountered during

initial experiences with the tech-

nology. Significantly, this dilemma

may be a false one because of a
second paradox in new technology

implementation: the paradox of ex-

perience.

PARADOX 2:

The Paradox of Experience

A central issue in the cognitively

elaborated model shown in Figur
2 is the timing of user experienc
with the new technology. In fact

the "paradox of value" rests on two

subtle but critical assumptions: (
that negative surprises are costly

and (2) that negative surprises have
no benefits. Both of these assump

tions are premised on a tradition
model of implementation in whic
implementers present a new tech
nology to users during unfreezing,

and then users first use the new

technology during movement. But

is this traditional model a necessary
technology work correctly because
premise?

implementers did not provide

enough practical information to in-

In his classic article on the "tech-

nology of foolishness," March

JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. V Number 4 Winter 1993
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Initialthere
experienceis
withvalue
a tech(1971) suggests that
nologyinstitutionalize
can be roughly divided into
when organizations
two to
types,
Free Training and
Ona way for members
challenge
the
the-Job Performance. Free Trainorganization's operational rules
ing refers to time taken to learn the
and cultural assumptions - to be
technology before users must ac"foolish." The organizational value
tually use the technology for reof foolishness, of course, is that an
quired work. Training with the
individual's challenges force the orparticular technology at the venganization to evaluate the wisdom
of its rules and assumptions. If an dor's site, practice in a classroom
setting, and free time at work are
organization's assumptions and
all examples of Free Training. The
rules are never challenged, they
may become obsolete and dysfunc- "free" in Free Training refers to
tional without anyone knowing it. the cost of mistakes. During training, the cost of making mistakes is
Foolishness allows an organization
to validate or modify its rules and relatively free. (For an in-depth discussion of manufacturing technolassumptions, to evolve and thereby
ogy training and practices, see
to remain viable. Of course, an orGoodman and Miller, 1990.) In
ganization can learn and adapt
contrast,
On-the-Job Performance
from foolishness only if foolishness
is initial experience while the user
can be accomplished at low cost.
is doing required work. While users
Costly foolishness may be no better
provided Free Training would be
for the organization than costly adexpected to continue to learn while
herence to outdated or dysfuncon the job, the distinction here is
tional rules and assumptions.
a critical one: Free Training does
The analog to March's foolishnot require that users perform reness in new technology implemen- quired work while initially experitation is the opportunity for users
encing the technology; On-the-Job
to test and modify their social conPerformance does. The importance
structions of a new technology. If of this distinction arises from the
implementers have led users to
cost and/or tension incurred by the
construct unrealistic and impractiusers when their expectations and
cal preliminary understandings of
understandings do not match the
a new technology, as shown in Figorganizational reality of using the
ure 2, experiences with the new
technology. Negative surprises will
technology will provide opportube high cost if encountered when
nities to test and modify those unthey are reflected on the job in the
derstandings. There remains,
user's performance. Negative surhowever, the caution offered by prises will be low cost for users if
March that the foolishness must
they take place before work is renot itself prove more costly than
quired or evaluated. These costs
holding an incorrect construction.
would be expected to affect one of
While cost in March's technology of
the central goals of implementafoolishness is cost to the organization - users' attitudes toward using
tion, in new technology implementhe technology.
tation the cost is also personal costMarch's point is that negative
to the user.
surprises provide important learnJOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. V Number 4 Winter 1993
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ing opportunities, but learning
opfor additional
information during
portunities that must experience
be managed.
with a new technology
Managing a learning opportunity
only if the frame they are provided
means no cost to the user
for
being
during
implementation
leads them

wrong or making mistakes
- that
to discover
that they are missing

learning is not punished,
as long As
as a result, if impleinformation.
the efforts are made inmenters
good faith.
present balanced views of
In many traditional change
a new efforts,
technology, there is some
the first real opportunity
for
danger
thatusers
users will confirm what

to experiment with the
new
they
have techbeen told and conclude
nology occurs when itthat
"counts,"
they understand the technolwhen mistakes are costly
tounbalanced
both
ogy. An
(positively bithe individual and theased)
organizapresentation by implementers,
tion. Free Training suggests
coston the a
other
hand, inevitably will
less opportunity for users to
lead users to encounter surprises

encounter negative surprises, when during implementation. Thus, users

these negatives might not be ex- will gain a healthy desire to learn
pected to have such a deleterious more, to explore more, as long as
effect on user attitudes.
encountering the suprises is not
This raises the second assump- costly! This healthy skepticism about
tion made in the "paradox of
the new technology should contribvalue" - that surprises have no ben- ute to the feedback-and-redesign
efits for users. As noted before,
processes necessary for implemenone of the primary goals of new tation success (Goodman and Griftechnology implementation is to in- fith, 1991), as well as greater
still in users appropriate attitudes knowledge of the system. Technoltoward the technology. An impor- ogies typically fit organizational and
tant component of appropriate at- user needs in some ways while needtitudes toward a new technology is
ing adjustment in others (Leonardthe belief that there is more to

Barton, 1988). When users have a
healthy skepticism about new techstance, creative new uses for the
nology, they will anticipate these isnew technology or even better wayssues. The result is that users are

learn; that there remain, for in-

for it to accomplish its intendedgiven the opportunity to take repurposes. Louis (1980) has noted
sponsibility for their own learning

that people typically test and mod-

ify their understandings using a
confirmation process. This means

that users* constructed understand-

ings will tell them how to interpret
their experiences with a new technology, and that users will modify
their constructions only if experiences invalidate the expectations.
The confirmation strategy is im-

portant because it suggests that

users will be motivated to search

(e.g., Bowen, 1980), learning by experience rather than by being told.

This should encourage more commitment (e.g., Salancik, 1977) and

more favorable attitudes toward the

technology.

The paradox of experience is

that a little failure is good, maybe
necessary, to successful implemen-

tation, and that disconfirmation is

useful as long as it is not costly to

users. When combined with the

JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. V Number 4 Winter 1993
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icing
(March
and Simon, 1958)
and
paradox of value,
the
paradox
of
experience suggests
the biases
implemenconfirmation
(Klayman and
tation outcomes shown
in Figure
4.
Ha, 1987). Users
in this situation
If users are provided
(by impleshould be relatively
pleased with
menters) Balanced (Realistic)
the technology. They will have enframes and are then give Free
countered no negative surprises
Training time, confirmation should and their performance should be
lead users to believe that there is
satisfactory, up to the level that
little more to learn about the techthey understand the technological
nology. As long as the accuracy of system. But these users will not
their frame holds, these users will continue to explore and adapt the
have been given a costless oppor- technology.
tunity to test their expectations
The above argument also largely
against reality. As their expecta- holds for users who are provided
tions are not challenged or discon- Balanced (Realistic) frames during
firmed (since they started with a implementation but are required to
realistic frame), they should verify first experience the technology
their understanding (construction) during On-the-Job Performance.
of the technology and not be mo- Even though mistakes are likely to
tivated to investigate the technolog- be costly, users are not likely to be
ical system further. This prediction surprised because they have a balis based on the susceptibility of in- anced (though perhaps shallow)
dividual decision makers to satisfunderstanding of the technology.
Figure 4

Critical Outcomes of Four Possible Implementation Techniques
Balanced Frame Unbalanced Frame

(Realistic/User) (Unrealistic/Implementer)
High Knowledge

Free Training Low Perceived Need to Learn High Perceived Need to Learn
High Performance

On-the-Job Performance Low Perceived Need to Learn Dissatisfaction

Note: These are the critical outcomes expected given the implementation technique described by
the specific quadrant
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Users in this quadrant are also

likely to test the technology, find it

to be as they expect, and thus suspend their tests (Klayman and Ha,
1987). Therefore, these users are
also expected (relative to other
quadrants in Figure 4) to not be-

surprised since technologies and
organizations are complex. Users

are missing information from three

of the four quadrants if they develop unbalanced frames. Given

that the bias of their frames is to-

ward Positive Description, challenges to their frames (surprises)
are also likely to be negative. The
aptations to make. As in the preeffect of these negative surprises is
vious quadrant, these users should
the basis for the predictions in the
be satisfied and able to perform
last two quadrants.
their basic tasks - but, again, are For users with positively Unbal-

lieve that there is much else to
learn or that there are more ad-

not inquisitive.

The Balanced implementation
frame scenarios engender satisfac-

tory but not completely successful

implementation. These implemen-

tation techniques may result in implementation that is only successful
in the short term, a form of im-

plementation failure (Goodman

and Griffith, 1991; Leonard-Bar-

ton, 1988). More specifically, the

users are able to perform the tasks
that the implementers have specifically prepared them for; however,

balanced implementation frames

do not instill in users the need for

anced frames, who receive their ex-

perience with the technology only
during On-the-Job Performance,
negative surprises may be very
costly. The scenario might be as
follows: users have tasks to perform; the implementers build up
the technology's capabilities in

terms of being able to complete the

task; but, because the users only
have been given a "sales-pitch" introduction, they may not be actually able to do the task. There also
may be some negative aspects of
using this technology to perform

this task. Consider electronic meet-

further discovery, and user knowl- ing support systems - such systems
edge of the system (and its further may provide benefits of documenadaptation and redesign) is likely to tation and anonymity, but users

stagnate. The users may have the should be aware of the possible

highest satisfaction, since there are costs of losing the emphasis of verno negative surprises in their initial bal exchanges. Finally, it may be

use. A discrepancy model of satis- that there are certain things the
users should not do in using the
eled by the discrepancy between technology. An example of this in
what is desired and the actual state
a computer setting might be, "Do
(e.g., Locke, 1969; Katzell, 1964)
not turn off the computer without
would certainly not predict dissatfirst saving your work." To do so
faction where satisfaction is mod-

isfaction.

Users who are provided Unbalanced frames during implementa-

tion are more likely to have volatile

implementations. Users with Un-

balanced frames are destined to be

and inadvertently destroy the work
would certainly provide a very negative surprise on most computer

systems.

If the users are required and responsible for completing a task
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(i.e., real, evaluated
on-the-job
perplace
without the pressures
of On-

formance), any of
the
above
scethe-Job
Performance,
attitudes
narios would be likely
to
invoke
should not be
negative
because misdisastrous results and
subsequently,
takes are
less costly. Performance

negative attitudes when
towards
the
techworking with
the technology

nology. Initial contacts
with
is finally required
shouldabenew
high,
technology are significant
socialigiven the greater understanding
of
zation experiences.
The results
of
the technology
from prior experi-

mentation.
Besides
these userslost
havcostly surprises for
users
(e.g.,

work, incomplete ing
tasks,
or have
simply
less risk, they
had more
frustration) during
the
initial
extime to
practice
before beginning
periences with thethe
technology
task. Users providedmay
with Free
be difficult to overcome.
Training and an Unbalanced frame
What if these negative surprises should understand that there is alwere encountered during Free
ways more to learn. Certainly there
was more for users to learn in the
Training? The previously mentioned discrepancy models of satbeginning and both Klayman and
isfaction (Locke, 1969; Katzell,
Has (1987) and Louis' (1980 and
1964) would still emphasize the dif- 1989) work lead us to predict that
ference between the desired and

challenges to users' beliefs will proactual level of performance, yet the
vide the impetus for users to con-

importance would be much lower.
tinue to look for new ways of
The impact of negative surprisesunderstanding the technology.
will be less if encountered during
Free Training than if encountered Beyond Paradox In New
during On-the-Job Performance Technology Implementation
because the cost of mistakes (to
users) is less during Free Training. The model presented here has
elaborated the role of cognitions The purpose of Free Training is to
specifically user and implementer
give the users costless opportunities
to experience the differences be-frames - in new technology imple-

tween their social construction of

mentation. The model reveals two

the technology and reality. Free paradoxes: the paradox of value
and the paradox of experience.
Training provides the opportunity
to correct users' understandings be-The paradox of value occurs when
fore they have to use the technolthe divergence between user
ogy for actual work, before thoseframes (the balanced information
negative surprises might enter intothat users need) and implementer
their individual performance re-frames (the unbalanced informa-

cords.

The predicted results are positive
with Unbalanced/Free Training im-

plementation. Knowledge should

be higher because the users discover the Negative Description and
Operational information for themselves. Because this learning takes

tion that implementers provide)

creates negative surprises for users

when they experience a new technology. The paradox of experience

is that these negative surprises

need not be costly and may be key
components of successful imple-

mentation.
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The distinction between balanced

framework for continuous im-

and unbalanced implementer frames provement of the organizational
is not equivalent to surprises and no and technological system (if this ensurprises for prospective users. Even ergy is not dampened by the perbalanced implementer presentations sonal necessity of simply getting the
are likely to produce some user sur- work done). The organizational ne-

prises. Implementers cannot avoid cessity of continuous adaptation

users being surprised. Implementers parallels the ideas of continuous
cannot transmit everything because improvement from Total Quality
the opportunity to transmit infor- Management (TQM). By drawing
mation during unfreezing is limited. from the more generally underAdditionally, implementers may not stood ideas of TQM, technology
fully understand the setting and/orimplementation may be able to

context themselves. So, for imple-build on some existing social con-

menters, the question is not whether structions. The social construction
there are going to be surprises (there of continuous improvement is posare), but how those surprises are go- sibly understood by the general

ing to be managed. Managing im- management population through
plementation surprises such that the extensive marketing given
they are costless is critical to height-TQM and the Malcolm Baldrige
ening the status of those surprises as quality award.
learning opportunities.
Continuous mutual adaptation
The frame-based model of imbetween new technology and the
plementation offered in this paper
organizational setting is a key procstresses the critical role of user exess in managing for successful imperiences with the unfreezing stageplementation (Leonard-Barton,
of implementation (when users are1988). However, managers must
being introduced to a new tech- accept and prepare for the necesnology). There is an interesting sary changes through budgeting,
parallel here to the emphasis of or- design and user/feedback groups,
ganizational development apfree training time, etc. Tyre and
proaches to change (e.g., Huse and Orlikowski (in press) provide data
Cummings, 1985). Organizational which suggest that current organdevelopment emphasizes the im- izational mechanisms provide limportance of doing diagnosis and
ited opportunities for adaptation

adoption with an eye to unfreezing,

after implementation. Thus, the in-

usually by involving prospective
users in adoption decision making.
This frame-based model of implementation emphasizes managing
unfreezing with an eye to move-

here first require innovation in the

The conflict between expecta-

This article focused on cognitions of the implementers and
users which may promote adaptation and deeper understanding of
new technologies. The key propo-

ment, by providing user experience
with the technology while mistakes
are still relatively costless.

tions and reality inherent in implementation provides the energy and

terrelated processes of redesign
and implementation suggested

implementation process itself. The
idea is to become better at being

more flexible and learning to learn.
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sition is that theogy
pitfall
unbalin a general of
organizational
anced implementation
and
sense. Next, frames
users must be prothe paradoxes ofvided
value
and
with problems
thatexpechallenge
rience may be turned
them to into
push the promises
technology and

of successful implementation.
Mantheir understanding of it. Most
im-

agers must prepare
and
the
portantly,
usersaccept
must be allowed
costs of the users
learning
to
bethe time to address these challenges
come experts:
without the burden of required
Tell me, and I forget
work or the onus of performance
Show me, and I remember
appraisal. Finally, managers need
Involve me, and I understand
to acknowledge that users will need

(Chinese proverb)

time later on, after they have beManagers wanting to apply thiscome comfortable with the tech-

philosophy to their new technology
implementations need only to chal-nology, to readdress the learning
lenge their users with the technol- process. Users will need the op-

ogy. First, the technology itselfportunity to find more difficult
must be designed with adaptationproblems and the chance to solve
these costlessly as well. Using this
in mind - the technology must be
flexible so that users can develop itimplementation technique should
increase users' knowledge of, posas their understanding of it and the
itive attitudes toward, and quality
context develops. This creates the
reality that there will always be use of the technology. These outmore to learn and, over time, will comes benefit the organization as

enhance the value of the technol-

well as its members.
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